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I. Introduction
The constitutionally protected status of speech is a familiar
feature of our jurisprudence.1 Free speech claims are often
upheld at the cost of significant competing public and private
interests. It is certainly possible to critique free speech case law
for unjustly adjudicating these conflicts merely in one or more
special contexts.2 The focus of this Article, however, is broader.
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017)
(providing a broad defense of much contemporary free speech law by one of its
leading architects). As the focus of this Article is on state action in First and
Fourteenth Amendment free speech jurisprudence, we largely set aside
concerns over private corporate actor restrictions on, e.g., useful access to
internet search engines and social media sites.
2. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
(2016) (urging revisions in both directions of the coverage and stringency of
free speech protection according to context). See, e.g., THE PRICE WE PAY: THE
CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura
Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995); Brian Leiter, The Case Against Free
Speech, 38 SYDNEY L. REV. 407 (2016) (“[T]he central question in free speech
jurisprudence should really be how to regulate speech effectively—to minimize
its very real harms, without undue cost to is positive values.”); Anthony
Leaker, Against “Free Speech”, CATO UNBOUND (June 13, 2018), www.cato*
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This Article proposes that the constitutional status of
freedom of speech depends on the current existence of some
sufficient sustaining foundations in cultural beliefs and values.
Our culture, however, has evolved in such a way as to now make
the general constitutionally protected status of speech into, at
best, an anachronism. Constitutionalized freedom of speech is,
at this point, a holdover from a time3 in which supportive
cultural beliefs and values sufficiently underwrote our
protective free speech jurisprudence.4 The traditional grounds
upon which freedom of speech was constitutionally prioritized
unbound.org/2018/06/13/anthony-leaker/against-free-speech (“[F]ree speech
has been co-opted to serve anti-democratic ends; [it] has become the rallying
point of decidedly unemancipatory political formations, invoked to attack equal
rights, social justice, and basic norms of tolerance and inclusion . . . .”).
3. This formulation implies that there was some prior time in which
cultural beliefs and values, and their institutional embodiment, better
supported the protected constitutional status of speech.
Or, more
metaphorically, that there was a time in which the cultural soil was more
conducive to the healthy rootedness of freedom of speech. It is certainly
possible to argue, though, that there was never a time in which freedom of
speech was well sustained by the underlying culture. In this Article, we focus
on the plausible claim that cultures can evolve over time in ways more, or less,
supportive of the constitutionally protected status of speech. This approach
does not deny that some elements of our culture that tend to either sustain or
undermine the status of free speech have remained constant and unchanging.
Nor does this approach claim that cultural support for the constitutional status
of free speech has more or less collapsed, as opposed to diminishing to a
significant degree.
4. It is, however, debatable whether there has been a “steady
deterioration over the last half century of the essential democratic norm of
freedom of speech.” Peter Berkowitz, Defending Democratic Norms Requires
Defending Free Speech, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Apr. 07, 2019),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/04/07/defending_democratic_n
orms_requires_defending_free_speech_139981.html.
See, e.g., James L.
Gibson, Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half
Century After McCarthyism, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96 (Jan. 2008). See also
Richard D. Schwartz, Stouffer: Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties:
A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind, 65 YALE L. J. 572 (1956)
(demonstrating substantial popular opposition to meaningful freedom of
speech. Also reporting majority or near majority opposition to the speech
rights of, e.g., admitted communists, atheists, and socialists); Jeremy BauerWolf, Survey: Tepid Support for Free Speech Among Students, INSIDE HIGHER
ED
(Jan.
30,
2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/01/30/survey-tepid-supportfree-speech-among-students (summarizing Speaking Freely: What Students
Think About Expression at American Colleges, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION (2018), https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/05104349/Student-Attitudes-AssociationSurvey.pdf).
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have been gradually dissipating, and no sufficient alternative
justifying grounds have taken their place.5
The standard justifications for constitutionalizing free
speech have eroded and become less meaningful. The elevated
constitutional status of freedom of speech can no longer be
justified by pointing to any sufficient cultural grounding for that
status. Cultures change over time6 in ways relevant to the
status of freedom of speech. In our cultural context, for example,
it is possible that massive aggregate wealth, however
maldistributed or unstable, has depleted the cultural values and
beliefs needed to justify constitutional freedom of speech.7
Collective wealth and other cultural factors can seem to insulate
us from the consequences of various forms of public speech that

5. Of course, this is a daunting task in some respects. Our culture has,
at all times, manifested speech taboos; shibboleths; public and private speech
suppression of various sorts; numbing campaigns of meme-repetition; agendaskewing; indignant shaming; mobbing; intimidation; exclusionism; egodefensive pathologies; and propagandized understandings of free speech itself.
Some account must also be taken of the effects on our public discourse of the
current technology-driven broadening of who can speak in some publicly
accessible fashion. Even if the number of U.S. monthly users of Twitter in
particular has recently declined, there are currently at least 60 million such
users. See J. Clement, Twitter: Number of Monthly Active U.S. Users 2010–
2019,
STATISTA
(Aug.
9,
2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/274564/monthly-active-twitter-users-inthe-united-states/.
6. Under one conventional approach, a hypothetical culture may, over
time, exhibit various mixtures of initial barbarism, mature civilization,
decadence and exhaustion, and ultimately a combination of self-indulgence
and a drive toward self-extinction. Like the mythic Sibyl at Cumae, some
civilizations may, in a sense, wish to die. See H.D. Cameron, The Sibyl in the
Satyricon, 65 CLASSICAL J. 337 (1970). See, e.g., JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN
TO DECADENCE: 1500 TO THE PRESENT: 500 YEARS OF WESTERN CULTURAL LIFE
(1st ed. 2001); DAVID WEIR, DECADENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2018).
See also G.W.F. HEGEL, Author’s Preface, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox
trans. 1952, 1969 ed.) (1821) (suggesting that only with civilizational decline
does wisdom arrive. Hegel did not, however, guarantee that all declining
civilizations will have the resources necessary to recognize the causes of their
decline). See generally EDWARD CAIRD, HEGEL (1972) (discussing Hegel’s
understanding of cultural vitality and development in his letter to Zeilmann
in which Hegel views the French Revolution as leaving behind the “baby shoes”
and “fetters” of the Ancient Regime).
7. See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
20TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (1996) (discussing themes from MANCUR OLSON,
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) and JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2008)).
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increasingly reflect one sort of pathology or another.8
Our focus is not upon economics as it affects culture but on
several important aspects of culture insofar as they affect the
net value of speech. In particular, we consider first the official
legal cultural beliefs embodied in Supreme Court opinions, as
those beliefs have evolved over time.9 The Court’s free speech
jurisprudence itself has already lost any clear, coherent, and
consistent sense of what the free speech clause is to mean and to
accomplish.10
Given the evolving case law, we then consider the commonly
accepted basic values thought to underlie the constitutionally
privileged status of speech.11 The Article then points out the
consequences, over time, of the underlying culture’s thinning out
and minimalizing what these underlying values amount to.12
This “thinning out” of our sense of what the free speech values
really amount to crucially impeaches the logic of according
specially protected constitutional status to speech at the expense
of other values and interests.13
These crucial effects of the changes in our cultural
understanding of the status and meaning of the values
underlying freedom of speech are, in turn, enhanced by a range
of important recent cultural trends in education and other
spheres.14 The benefits of freedom of speech have been gradually
reduced because of these sustained cultural trends. We then
illustrate, through the case law, some important increasing
cultural costs incurred when current free speech claims override
significant conflicting values.15
A brief Conclusion then
follows.16

8. See generally ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE
(Routledge ed. 1992) (discussing, inter alia, what has become increasingly
prominent public speech phenomena of denial, projection, and displacement of
affect).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Parts II, III.
12. See infra Parts II, III.
13. See infra Parts II, III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part VI.
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II. The Court Recognizes, and Then Gradually Loses Clarity
with Respect to, Foundational Free Speech Values
The history of the Supreme Court’s free speech
jurisprudence is complex and not susceptible to simple
generalization. Clearly, though, there are historic moments of
judicial endorsement of basic speech values that resonate and,
in a sense, persist.17 But those moments may lose their
importance over time, particularly when the broad underlying
culture no longer genuinely validates the basic free speech
values in question.
Among these classic moments of the judicial endorsement of
underlying free speech values would be judicial assertions that
the First Amendment should favor “free trade in ideas,”18 and
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”19
More
elaborately, Justice Brandeis celebrated the values of “the
discovery and spread of political truth,”20 deliberation rather
than arbitrariness of government,21 and the development of
one’s faculties,22 all through freedom of speech.23
These themes were then pursued in later cases, such as
Thornhill v. Alabama24 and Keyishian v. Board of Regents.25
And it is fair to say that themes—such as the pursuit of truth,
promoting democratic self-government, and facilitating selfrealization, as presumably promoted by constitutional freedom
17. See, e.g., THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970); HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICAN (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
18. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
19. Id. See also Nat’l Inst. Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2375 (2018).
20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (discussing “the power of free and fearless
reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and
economic truth” as well as the role of freedom of speech in “popular
government”).
25. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing classrooms as “peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas’” through which “the robust exchange of ideas” may lead
to the discovery of truth without any censorial skewing or pre-selection).
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of speech—continue to arise in the Court’s ongoing free speech
jurisprudence. But it is also fair to say that in recent years, the
Court’s concern for these purported basic free speech values has
been gradually diminishing. This latter development reflects,
with some time lag, broad cultural shifts in the meaning, depth,
and significance of the classic free speech values and their
obvious assumptions and prerequisites.
The Court’s gradually diminishing reliance on the classic
free speech values does not imply that the Court has contracted
the scope of free speech protection; typically, far from it. In
particular, the Court has come to adopt the speech of pure
commercial transactions between sellers and buyers of
consumer goods and services as falling within the scope and
protection of the free speech clause.26 Purely commercial
barroom nude dancing, undertaken for the sake of increased
income, is also now assumed to be within the compass of freedom
of speech.27 So is speech in the form of a deliberate lie, uttered
merely for the sake of deceiving an audience into according
undeserved respect to the speaker, to the effect that the speaker
has been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.28
Scrupulous concern for the free speech rights of traffickers in the
video depiction of the torturous extinction of helpless animals is
judicially observed.29 Restrictions on the sale to minors of
especially violent video games, even when the game is held to
lack serious relevant value,30 violate freedom of speech,31 partly
on the grounds of the murkiness of any line between politics and
sheer entertainment.32 Speech, whether protected or not, has
been detected even in the professed absence of any intent to
convey any relevant message.33
26. See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (discussing pure commercial product
advertising).
27. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563, 565–66
(1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality).
28. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012) (Kennedy,
J., plurality).
29. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 464, 465–66 (2010).
30. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011).
31. Id. at 791–93.
32. Id. at 790 (“[I]t is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment
and dangerous to try.”).
33. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (discussing a
banner that stated “Bong Hits For Jesus” as, per Frederick himself, “just

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5

6

2019

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

241

The point is not that any of these cases was rightly or
wrongly decided, or that the current Court always decides free
speech cases in the spirit of these cases. Rather, the idea is that
these cases, whether mistaken or not, generally do not rely on
the logic of any of the Court’s classic expositions of the basic
values thought to underlie the specially protected status of
speech. Thus, while each of the cases above may be defensible,
it would be difficult to persuasively defend these cases by appeal
to the values endorsed historically in the Abrams dissenting
opinion,34 the Whitney concurring opinion,35 the Thornhill
opinion,36 the Keyishian opinion,37 or any other such classic basic
free speech value statement.
This is not to suggest that the Court has begun to
consciously reduce its reliance on the classic free speech values
or on any metaphysically ambitious understanding of those
values. There are indeed instances of a reduced judicial focus on
truth, democracy, and self-realization as underlying guides in
free speech cases. As the Court’s thinking comes to be influenced
by the evolving cultural life and the elite and popular
metaphysical assumptions of the day, the Court’s assumptions
need not be explicitly articulated by the Court.
Courts generally need not even be aware of, let alone
articulate, the evolving cultural assumptions underlying their
opinions. Lord Keynes famously observed a cultural process of
elite influence and its generally unrecognized character in
declaring that even “[m]admen in authority . . . are distilling
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I
am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated
nonsense meant to attract television cameras”). See also Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563, (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality); Burge v.
Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1060 (D. Or. 2015) (holding that
protected, on free speech grounds, a student’s social media post to the effect
that a low grade-assigning teacher “needs to be shot”). In the broader context,
it is apparently well-established that freedom of speech protects rude gestures
directed toward a particular police officer. See Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard, 918
F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th
Cir. 1997)).
34. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
35. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
36. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
37. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.”38 Similar
largely elite-level influences, whether direct or indirect,
undiluted or diluted, articulated or in-articulated, would affect
Supreme Court members as well.39
As we might expect, the Court displays ambivalence as to
the nature of any grounds underlying the constitutional
commitment to freedom of speech. Consider, for example, the
striking, if largely unacknowledged, contrast in approach
between the direct political protest case of Cohen v. California40
and the “seven dirty words” case of FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.41 The two case outcomes may be compatible, but
they clearly bespeak two distinct understandings of how culture
informs free speech laws.
The Cohen case thus invokes the classic Brandeis
concurrence in Whitney,42 but then famously declares that
While the particular four letter word being
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than
most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often
true that once man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.
Indeed, we think it is largely because government
officials cannot make principled distinctions in
this area that the Constitution leaves matters of
taste and style so largely to the individual.43
Courts generally do not attempt to do philosophy. So we
should not expect the Court to announce its endorsement, in this
respect, of any sort of underlying relativism, subjectivism, or of
38. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 383 (2018 ed.) (1938).
39. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006); NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM,
THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME
COURT (2019) (discussing elite and other cultural influences on the Supreme
Court with an emphasis on partisan political conflict).
40. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
41. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion).
42. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
43. Id. See also Brief for the Cato Inst., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302), 2018 WL
7890204 (“[T]here cannot be one consensus standard of ‘scandalous language’
in a heterogeneous society.”).
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underlying arbitrariness. In referring to the question as merely
one of “taste and style,”44 the Court clearly draws upon these
rationally modest categories. Of taste, after all, there is
proverbially no disputing.45 A genuine preference for the taste
of vanilla over strawberry is hardly subject to evidence-based
debate.
Such preferences require neither interesting
metaphysical assumptions nor controversial foundations.
Crucially, the Court in Cohen then apparently links the use
of profanity with valuable emotional fervor, and reports that
Much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function . . . . [W]ords are often
chosen as much for their emotive46 as for their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that
the Constitution . . . has little or no regard for that
emotive function which, practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated.47
Whatever the contribution of emotion itself to the logic of
constitutionally protecting speech may be,48 emotional
expression by itself typically does not make any crucial
assertions that can be meaningfully investigated as to their

44. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
45. See De gustibus non est disputandum, MERRIAM WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/de%20gustibus%20non%20est%20disputandum (last
visited Oct. 26, 2019) (“[T]here is no disputing about taste”). See also DAVID
SOBEL, FROM VALUING TO VALUE: A DEFENSE OF SUBJECTIVISM (1st ed. 2016)
(providing a sophisticated approach to the subjectivity of values).
46. Authors have elaborated on the subject at a more formal meta-ethical
level. See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH & LOGIC (2d ed. 1952);
CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); J.O. URMSON, EMOTIVE
THEORY OF ETHICS (1968); Stephen A. Satris, The Theory of Value and the Rise
of Ethical Emotivism, 43 J. HIST. IDEAS 109 (1982). See also Richard Joyce,
Moral Anti-Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 11, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism; Mark von Roojen, Moral
Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 28, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism.
47. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
48. See generally R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to
Freedom of Speech, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2003) (discussing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
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truth or falsity in any objective or grounded sense.49 Emotions
themselves are doubtless often based on beliefs that may be true
or false. But the emotional expression by itself does not state
some proposition claiming any objective grounding in the world,
beyond the speaker’s own subjectivity.
By contrast, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,50 the Court
plurality adopted a significantly different approach than in
Cohen. One might imagine that George Carlin’s “seven dirty
words,” as expressed in his recorded monologue in Pacifica,51
could reasonably be thought of as vulgar, offensive, shocking, or
not, depending upon one’s tastes and political sensibilities. That
would reflect the Court’s approach to Cohen. However, the
Court plurality in Pacifica instead peremptorily declares that “it
is undisputed that the content of Pacifica’s [“seven dirty words”]
broadcast was ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking.’”52
The undisputed vulgarity, offensiveness, and shockingness
of George Carlin’s monologue might have come as a surprise to
some of its willing listeners, if not to the defendants. What
should have been undisputed, under the Cohen precedent, was
that some people, certainly, would find the monologue vulgar,
offensive, and shocking. Restricting speech that predictably
offends some people but not others is a possible rule, but not a
rule that Pacifica endorses.
Pacifica, however, leaves unclear the real basis for declaring
that the Carlin language is vulgar, offensive, and shocking.
Perhaps the underlying logic is that the Carlin monologue really
is—or else really and objectively should be judged—vulgar,
offensive, and shocking by any reasonable person.
This
interpretation would emphasize any possible objective grounds
underlying such a judgment. Or perhaps the Court instead
recognized the sheer disputability and relativism of any such
judgment, and then, consistent with that relativism, chose
merely to endorse and impose its own subjectively preferred

49. One might consider an honest and sincere emotional expression to be,
perhaps, overwrought, or otherwise inappropriate, but the Court in Cohen is
explicitly separating emotive speech, or its supposed equivalent, emotional
speech, from speech with cognitive content.
50. Compare FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion), with
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 14 (1971).
51. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745–47.
52. Id. at 747.
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view.53
More decisively, though, it is clear that Pacifica affords less
scope for the constitutional protection of emotive speech than
was contemplated in Cohen.54 For the Cohen Court, the
cognitive and emotive meanings of an expression may be
inseparable, or of comparable importance, for free speech
purposes.55 In contrast, the Pacifica plurality contends for the
general separability of the message’s content from the way,
perhaps emotional, in which that content is delivered. Thus the
Pacifica Court declared that “[a] requirement that indecent
language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language.”56
Overall, we have herein no interest in endorsing any
particular approach to typical free speech cases. Rather, our
point is to highlight the increasingly uncertain relationship
between the Court’s free speech jurisprudence and the basic
values commonly thought to underlie that jurisprudence. The
meaning, import, substance, and implications of those
underlying values seem increasingly unclear. Immediately
below, we briefly focus on the basic historic underlying free
speech values themselves and begin the process of accounting
for the Court’s increasing lack of clarity and certainty in these
respects.
III. The Traditional Free Speech Values and the Gradual
Flattening of Their Meaning
There has long been a reasonably broad consensus as to the
most important values thought to justify according special
53. Any logical relationship between relativism and tolerance is dubious
at best. One’s group perspective may simply endorse imposing the group’s
substantive perspective on other groups, with no pretense to objective
rightness or wrongness of any stance. See Maria Baghramian & J. Adam
Carter, Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 11, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism; Chris Gowans, Moral Relativism,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Apr.
20,
2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/.
54. See sources cited supra notes 40–43.
55. See Wright, supra note 48.
56. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18.
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constitutional protection to much speech. While the basic free
speech values list can be expanded,57 there is much agreement
as to the roles of: (1) promoting in particular a general search for
truth; (2) facilitating a meaningful process of democratic
government; and (3) encouraging meaningful self-realization,
self-actualization, or genuine autonomy.
Probably the most striking defense of these three
underlying values on the merits has been John Stuart Mill’s
classic On Liberty.58 In particular, Mill’s exposition of the values
of truth and, especially, of meaningful self-realization conveys
the sense that some states of affairs are, whether we all agree or
not, objectively higher or better than others.59
The three basic free speech values have of late been
explicitly identified by a number of American constitutional law
writers, including: Thomas Emerson60; Frederick Schauer61;
Mark Tushnet, Alan K. Chen, and Joseph Blocher62; Kent
Greenawalt63; and Alexander Tsesis.64 And the values of the
57. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the distinctive emphasis on tolerance); Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977)
(discussing the government-checking function of speech).
58. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 115–28 (Gertrude Himmelfarb
ed., Penguin Group 1974) (1859).
59. Id. at 127–28 (discussing higher, better, and more fully developed
characters). See also JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10 (George Sher ed.,
2d ed. 1863) (“It is better to be . . . Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
And if the fool . . . [is] of a different opinion, it is because they only know their
own side of the question.”).
60. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (referring to “assuring individual self-fulfillment,”
“advancing knowledge and discovering truth,” universal “participation in
decision making,” along with balancing “healthy cleavage and necessary
consensus,” or a “balance between stability and change”).
61. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY (1982) (discussing arguments from pursuing truth, from promoting
popular sovereignty, and from self-development through social
communication).
62. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN, & JOSEPH BLOCHER,
FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(2017).
63. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 119, 130–47 (1989) (discussing, among other values, “truth discovery,”
“autonomy and personal development,” and “the functioning of liberal
democracy”).
64. See generally Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015
U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2015) (identifying the desire “to further democratic
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pursuit of truth,65 meaningful democratic governance,66 and selfrealization and autonomy67 have been the subject of continuing
institutions,” to promote “personal autonomy,” and “the advancement of
knowledge,” while arguing for the excessive narrowness and incompleteness of
this value enumeration).
65. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 965 (1978) (denying the existence of objective
truth); Christopher Bezemek, The Epistemic Neutrality of the Marketplace of
Ideas: Milton, Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes on Falsehood and Freedom of
Speech, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 159 (2015); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1, 5 (1984) (noting the waning
popularity of the idea of objective truth); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the
Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 4, 25
(1995) (stating “objective truth may (or may not) be non-existent or
unintelligible,” but the “truth” value to be realized is not in the possible
attainment of truth, but rather, in the “existential [and thus actually or
potentially non-objective] value of the search itself”) (stating “reliance on the
actual existence of truth is not necessary to support the search for truth
rationale”); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the
Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231 (2017); Frederick
Schauer, Reflections On the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699, 724
(1991) (“[T]he issue is often power rather than truth, and . . . the value of truth
(or knowledge) often lies in its being instrumental to some deeper value such
as (but not limited to) power”); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and
Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (1987); Irene M.
Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s
and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 35 (2013); Christopher C. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 672 (1986). Beyond the legal literature,
consider the traditionalist belief in a “desire to know” that is “independent of
the individual’s likes and dislikes, or his wishful and anxious thinking.”
BERNARD LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in
COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 619 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert
M. Doran eds., 5th ed. 1992).
66. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2016) (“Freedom of speech does
more than promote democracy; it also promotes a democratic culture”
(emphasis in original)); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression For the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (emphasizing the possibilities for both new
opportunities for cultural participation and new mechanisms for constricting
and skewing such participation); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First
Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2016) (emphasizing Jeffersonian
meaningful and active citizenship); Blasi, supra note 57; Robert Post,
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011)
(“[T]he best possible explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is
the value of democratic self-governance.”). Professor Post also endorses the
consensus on the three core free speech values. See id. at 478. See also Kate
Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).
67. See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22 (2017)
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debate.
For our purposes, we assume that some combination of one
or more of these traditionally cited values can—at least on some
possible definitions and under some possible cultural
circumstances—suffice to justify special constitutional
protection for speech. The problem, though, is that under our
continually evolving cultural circumstances, the meaning and,
crucially, the depth of meaning of the key concepts has
significantly changed. These changes in meaning, in general,
have been in the direction of the thinning out, flattening,
reduction in depth, reduction in ambition, insubstantiality, and
even the moral trivialization of the terms in question.
Thus the very idea of truth, most crucially, today tends not
to mean what it once might have meant. Similarly, the ideas of
self-realization, of the development of one’s potential, and of
autonomy have tended to flatten, undergo minimization, and to
be reduced to more superficial understandings than might once
have been the case. Even our understandings of democratic self(emphasizing Thomas Emerson’s concern for “individual self-fulfillment”
through freedom of speech); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM (2019)
(emphasizing agency and autonomy with no distinctive reference to freedom of
speech in particular); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 251, 253 (2011) (discussing autonomy as “the capacity to pursue
successfully the life she endorses—self-authorized at least in the sense that,
no matter how her image of a meaningful life originates, she now can endorse
that life for reasons that she now accepts”); Id. at 966 (focusing on speech that
“fosters individual self-realization and self-determination”); Susan J. Brison,
The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 313 (1998) (discerning and
critiquing six distinguishable senses of the idea of autonomy); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 877–78 (1994)
(distinguishing “descriptive” autonomy from “ascriptive” or (largely)
normatively recognizable autonomy, or a right thereto); Stephen M. Feldman,
Postmodern Free Expression: A Philosophical Rationale for the Digital Age, 100
MARQUETTE L. REV. 1123 (2017) (focusing on autonomy as self-emergence
based on “relational” autonomy); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the SelfRealization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998); Martin Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantee of speech ultimately serves only one true value, which I have labeled
‘individual self-realization.’”); T.M. Scanlon, Comment on Baker’s Autonomy
and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 319 (2011) (stating that, contrary
to his own previous beliefs, “the concept of autonomy is not a helpful one”);
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (focusing in particular on autonomy as “a
person’s control over her own reasoning processes”). For a broader survey, see
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Jan.
9,
2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/.
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governance have undergone a gradual evacuation of depth and
substantiality of meaning, due largely to the gradual attention
and evacuation of the former meanings of truth and of selfrealization and autonomy.
Crucially, these cultural trends have reached a point at
which “truth,” “democracy,” and “autonomy,” as we currently
tend to understand them, no longer suffice to appropriately
justify a general exaltation of freedom of speech above a wide
range of competing public and private desires, preferences, and
interests. Our collective culture does not, at this point,68
adequately ground a distinctively general constitutionally
protected status for speech.69 As our understanding of the very
ideas70 of truth, democracy, and autonomy become increasingly
limited, attenuated, and contested, their power to justify
inescapably costly constitutional practices and institutions is
inevitably reduced.
Most fundamentally, consider the gradual erosion of the
depth of meaning and metaphysical ambition of the idea of the
pursuit, however fallibly and haltingly, of truth. Where the
understanding of truth itself as foundational was perhaps at one
point largely taken for granted, or at least familiar, we take
ourselves of late to be living in some sort of largely or
increasingly “post-truth” culture. “Post-truth” was the Oxford
Dictionary’s word of the year in 2016.71 Of course, this popular
usage can itself hardly explain cultural trends before its own rise
to prominence. And the idea of post-truth is often used in rather
narrow, transient political contexts.72
But the idea of a post-truth culture, whatever its precise
import, can also draw upon more sustained underlying cultural
68. We leave aside the question of whether our then current
understanding of the basic free speech values sufficiently justified
constitutionalizing free speech at any point in our cultural history.
69. We also set aside the possibility of adequately justifying
constitutionalized free speech by means of some logic apart from reliance on
one or more of the consensual basic free speech values discussed later in this
article.
70. Thus, our argument does not depend on any claim of increased
prevalence of say, lying in public, as long as the dominant cultural
understanding of the fundamental nature of lying remains unchanged.
71.
Post-truth,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES
(2016),
https://languages.oup.com/press/news/2016/12/11/WOTY-16.
72. As in its use in describing only particular political actors, as opposed
to much broader and sustained cultural phenomena.
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trends, whether at popular or elite cultural levels.73 Some
analyses of post-truth point to the accruing influence of initially
elite-level, but now more broadly influential, post-modernism.74
The post-truth culture can be seen, at least in part, as the
accruing result of the broadly postmodernist view that the very
idea of “a right or wrong answer to what a text (whether written
or behavioral) ‘meant’” should be interrogated, though
presumably not for its objective truth or falsity.75 On this typical
understanding of post-modernism, “[s]ince there is no such thing
as ‘truth,’ anyone who claims to ‘know’ something [or,
presumably, even to pursue the truth with humility] is really
just trying to oppress us, not educate us. Having power allows
us to control what is true,76 not the other way around.”77
By implication, if truth is largely reducible to something
akin to power, to perspective, to any large number of disparate
perspectives, or to indefinitely shifting perspectives not further
accountable to anything apart from power, the idea of truth can
hardly provide even a contribution to a convincing account of
why freedom of speech should, despite its evident costs, be
constitutionally enshrined. The basic problem is that as truth’s
linkage to the idea of any sort of objective reality is loosened or
disavowed,78 the utility of the idea of truth in justifying broad
freedom of speech is thereby reduced or eliminated.

73. See, e.g., MICHIKO KAKUTANI, THE DEATH OF TRUTH: NOTES ON
FALSEHOOD IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 73 (2018) (“The postmodernist argument that
all truths are partial (and a function of one’s perspective) led to a related
argument that there are many legitimate ways to understand or represent an
event.”); Id. at 167 (quoting the critic George Saunders to the effect that “[o]ur
national language . . . had become . . . dumbed down—at once ‘aggressive,
anxiety-provoking, maudlin, polarizing’”). These phenomena presumably
accrue and gain influence over decades.
74. See id.
75. LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 125 (2018).
76. Cf. Nemo veritatem regit, AM. PHIL. PRACS. ASS’N, https://appa.edu/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2019) (“Nobody governs truth”).
77. MCINTYRE, supra note 75, at 126.
78. See generally JENNIFER KAVANAUGH, NEWS IN A DIGITAL AGE:
COMPARING THE PRESENTATION OF NEWS INFORMATION OVER TIME AND ACROSS
MEDIA PLATFORMS (2018) (discussing the gradual shift in news reporting over
recent decades from aspirations toward objectivity to more subjective,
emotional, or advocacy-driven emphases); Rose McDermott, Psychological
Underpinnings of Post-Truth in Political Beliefs, 52 POL. SCI. & POL. 218
(2019); S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the
Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 137 (2017).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5

16

2019

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

251

The effects introduced by a broadly construed postmodernism thus run far deeper than merely new forms of
censorship or restrictions on, and difficulties in acquiring and
communicating, presumably valuable views and information.79
But the relevant cultural trends undermining the basic values
thought to underlie freedom of speech are much broader than
can be ascribed to post-modernism. As one leading philosopher
summarized the matter, “it is fair to say that almost all the
trends in the last generation of serious philosophy lent aid and
comfort to the ‘anything goes’ climate . . . [and] any hope for a
genuine vindication of knowledge and rationality went into
retreat.”80
As the widespread references to post-modernism in
particular suggest, the effects of various sorts of less ambitious
and less robust approaches to the ideas of truth, knowledge, and
ethics have gradually extended beyond academic departments.
As another leading philosopher observed, “[e]specially within
the academy, but also and to some extent outside of it, the idea
that there are ‘many equally valid ways of knowing the
world’ . . . has taken very deep root. In vast stretches of the
humanities and social sciences, this sort of ‘postmodernist
relativism’ about knowledge has achieved the status of an
orthodoxy.”81
Within the scope of philosophy, we find approaches to
metaphysics, knowledge, truth, and ethics, a wide range of views
that cannot sustainably underwrite any constitutional
79. See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of
Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 175–77 (2018) (assuming the elusive
existence of objective facts, even if as “an endangered species”); Sarah C. Haan,
Facebook’s Alternative Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 18, 19–20 (2019) (discussing the
fraught relationship between the major social media sites, including Facebook,
and the aim of promoting some optimally free mechanism of communicating
views and ideas without undue public or private distortion); Sarah C. Haan,
The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L. J. 1 (2019). More ambitiously,
Professor Joseph Blocher seeks to largely bypass the difficulties posed by a
post-truth culture by emphasizing not simply truth, or the pursuit thereof, but
the idea of knowledge, or distinctly valuable and justified true belief. See
Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief, 132 HARV. L. REV. 3
(2019). Of course, both knowledge and justified true belief, however
supplemented, inescapably depend upon some underlying continuing sense of
truth.
80. SIMON BLACKBURN, TRUTH: A GUIDE 139 (2005).
81. PAUL A. BOGHOSSIAN, FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: AGAINST RELATIVISM AND
CONSTRUCTIVISM 2 (2006).
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privileging of free speech. Among these approaches we find, in
no particular order: various forms of moral skepticism82; moral
relativism83; moral fictionalism84; moral anti- and quasirealism85; emotivism86; constructivism in ethics87 and politics88;
certain forms of philosophical pragmatism89; and various forms
of strict materialism90 and physicalism.91 Each of these
currently popular approaches can be contrasted with varieties of
moral realism and with other dimensions of realism and the
search for objectivity.92
82. See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(May
17,
2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral.
83. See, e.g., Chris Gowans, Moral Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism; Richard
Joyce, Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moralobjectivity-relativism.html.
84. See, e.g., MARC ELI KALDERON, MORAL FICTIONALISM (2005); Richard
Joyce, Moral Fictionalism: How to Have Your Cake and Eat It Too, in THE END
OF MORALITY: TAKING MORAL ABOLITIONISM SERIOUSLY 150 (Richard Garner &
Richard Joyce eds., 2019). See also Matti Eklund, Fictionalism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Oct.
19,
2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism/.
85. See, e.g., J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1978);
Simon Blackburn, Anti-Realist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY (David Copp ed. 2009); Joyce, supra note 46;
Richard Joyce, Projectivism and Quasi-Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/projectivismquasi-realism.html; von Roojen, supra note 46.
86. See URMSON, supra note 46; Satris, supra note 46.
87. See, e.g., Carla Bagnoli, Constructivism in Metaethics, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(June
23,
2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructivism-metaethics/; David O. Brink,
Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 71 (1987).
88. See, e.g., George Klosko, Political Constructivism in Rawl’s Political
Liberalism, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635 (1997).
89. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1990); RICHARD RORTY & PASCAL ENGEL, WHAT’S THE
USE OF TRUTH? (William McCuaig trans., 2007). See also R. George Wright,
Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 103 (2004).
90.
See, e.g., William Ramsey, Eliminative Materialism, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Mar.
11,
2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
91. See, e.g., Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Mar. 9, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/.
92. See, e.g., GUY AXTELL, OBJECTIVITY (2016); DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL
REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989); DAVID ENOCH, TAKING
MORALITY SERIOUSLY: A DEFENSE OF ROBUST REALISM (reprint ed. 2013);
NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF IMPERSONAL REASON
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Each of these and other popular schools of thought accept,
at best, only a remarkably modest, attenuated role for the idea
of truth, or the pursuit thereof. None of these approaches
appears to underwrite a judgment that the value of the pursuit
of truth justifies any distinctive constitutionally protected status
for speech in its recurring conflicts with other, often less
metaphysically ambitious values. Again, this is not to endorse
or critique any of the above approaches. The point is that none
can explain, or otherwise vindicate, a constitutional
commitment to speech in particular.93
As well, popular notions of an autonomous self cannot
justify distinctive constitutional protection for speech. This
conclusion flows naturally from minimizing, if not dismissing,
any robust ambitious approach to truth or knowledge.
Autonomy without a sufficiently robust understanding of truth
is already disqualified as a satisfactory reason for endorsing
constitutionalized free speech. But the recent tendency to
minimize the idea of a meaningful, continuing, autonomous self
in particular also deserves brief consideration in its own right.94
Consider, for example, Professor C. Edwin Baker’s
description of the relevant sense of autonomy.95 Professor Baker
suggests that
[A] person’s autonomy might reasonably be
(1997); RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU, MORAL REALISM: A DEFENSE (2005); Geof SayreMcCord, Moral Realism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/. See also DOES ANYTHING
REALLY MATTER?: ESSAYS ON PARFIT ON OBJECTIVITY (1st ed. 2017); Tim
Maudlin, The Defeat of Reason, BOS. REV. (June 1, 2018),
www.bostonreview.net/science-nature-philosophy-religion/tim-maudlindefeat-reason.
93. Professor Steven D. Smith critiques the short-sightedness of attempts
to ground a convincing, effective, motivating approach to valuing freedom of
speech on skeptical or relativist grounds. Professor Smith also doubts the
suitability of skeptical or minimalist approaches to any autonomous self in
validating autonomy and self-realization as core free speech values. See Steven
D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression,
60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 653, 677–78 (1987).
94. We assume that a democratic self-governance justification for free
speech will likely depend on a sufficiently meaningful understanding of truth
and of autonomy, and will thus rise or fall with those lines of justifying free
speech.
95. See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
251, 253 (2011).
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conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully
the life she endorses—self-authored at least in the
sense that no matter how her image of a
meaningful life originates, she can endorse that
life for reasons she now accepts.96
This is a mainstream understanding of what autonomy, in the
relevant sense, amounts to.97 But on standard interpretations,
it can hardly underwrite distinctive constitutional protection for
speech.
Classically, one might well have asked also about the nature
of the process by which the person in question initially arrived
at, now endorses, and currently approves of her own continuing
endorsement of her successfully pursued life goals. Professor
Baker sets aside questions as to how the person’s life goals were
initially generated.98 His focus is instead on the person’s mere
current endorsement of the person’s beliefs,99 however acquired,
and of the person’s motivating reasons.100 The problem is that
just as one’s initial inclinations to pursue one goal or another
may have been mechanically, or coercively, caused, so certainly
may be one’s current endorsement of those inclinations.101 Such
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE
PATERNALISM (2013); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY (1988); JASON HANNA, IN OUR BEST INTEREST: A DEFENSE OF
PATERNALISM (2018); ANDREW SNEDDON, AUTONOMY (2013); THE INNER
CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY (Christine Schultz ed., 2014)
(1989); Marina Oshana, How Much Should We Value Autonomy?, in AUTONOMY
99 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2003); R.S. Downie & Elizabeth Telfer,
Autonomy, 46 J. ROYAL INST. PHIL. 293 (1971); Robert Young, Autonomy and
the “Inner Self”, 17 AM. PHIL. Q. 35 (1980).
98. See Baker, supra note 95, at 253.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 90–91. See also FRANCIS CRICK,
THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE SOUL 3 (First
Touchstone ed. 1995); Joshua D. Greene, Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s
Last Stand, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 263 (Alexander Todorov et al. eds., 2011);
Anthony R. Cashmore, The Lucretian Swerve: The Biological Basis of Human
Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4999
(Mar. 9, 2010); Carol Hoefer, Causal Determinism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Jan.
21,
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/
(discussing the deterministic events, randomness, and sheer luck). See
generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (2016 ed.) (discussing the implication
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coercion can hardly be generally compatible with meaningful
autonomy.
In the alternative, consider a process of belief formation and
endorsement that is entirely reducible to the mere interactions
of waves and particles, on whatever scale; or, more concretely,
one might think of controlling the person’s “endorsement” via,
say, non-consensual brain implants, hostile socialization,
surreptitious drugging, behavioral conditioning, or any other
form of coercive influence, all of which would be incompatible
with standard views of meaningful autonomy.102 Even if one
wished to think of autonomy as somehow compatible with
typical forms of coercion, attempting to bring coercion in general
into play at the very foundation of constitutional freedom of
speech simply does not seem plausible.
Professor Baker’s account does, however, specify that the
subject’s endorsement has been based on acceptable reasons.103
The problem here is that the very idea of a human’s actions being
genuinely motivated, or effectively caused, by anything as
abstract and ethereal as a reason is of currently diminished
appeal.104 If, as we have increasingly come to believe, everything
is or can be reduced to the realm of the physical,105 the place for
causally effective reasons, as normally understood, becomes
dubious. Whatever the idea of “a person’s control over her own
reasoning processes”106 is intended to mean, any such control is
increasingly thought to be either impossible, or else not so
distinctive as to validate a constitutional right to freedom of
speech.107
of coercion for autonomy); NOMOS XIV: COERCION (J. Roland Pennock & Alan
W. Chapman eds., 1972); Scott Anderson, Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Oct. 27, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/.
102. See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra note 101; NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra
note 101; Anderson, supra note 101.
103. See Baker, supra note 95.
104. See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY MATERIALISM: A READER (Paul K. Moser &
J.D. Trout eds., 1995); J. J. C. Smart, Materialism, 60 J. PHIL. 651 (1963).
105. See Baker, supra note 95.
106. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (discussing an extended series
of causal events, encompassing merely randomly probabilistic events, that
happens to involve or terminate in brain processes does not seem to generate
a normatively decisive distinction between autonomy and non-autonomy).
107. Part of the problem is that we tend increasingly to reject the
essential metaphysics of classical Kantian autonomy, while attempting to
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This particular free speech value is often stated, however,
not in terms of autonomy, but in terms of something like selfrealization, self-fulfillment, self-development, self-perfection, or
self-actualization.108 These conceptions do not bypass the
fundamental problem of a diminishing cultural belief in the sort
of metaphysical freedom ultimately required for a sufficient
justification for constitutional freedom of speech. Briefly put, if
we are somehow reducible to anything like atoms and the void,109
sacrificing less ambitious values, such as sensory pleasure, for
the sake of an illusory sense of metaphysical freedom will
ultimately have minimal appeal.
But even if the problems that any combination of inevitable
causal chains and sheer randomness pose for sufficiently
meaningful freedom can be set aside, there remains the fact that
both autonomy and self-realization (and a variety of synonyms)
have undergone a process of cultural flattening akin to what we
have recognized in ethical thinking more generally.110
Autonomy and self-realization can certainly be taken in thin,
minimalist senses111 requiring little in the way of
metaphysics.112 The problem, though, is that to the extent that
retain its persuasive force and appeal. See Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy
Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS 312, 323 (1998). Kantian autonomy
classically requires robust notions of reason, dignity, and freedom of the will
independent of any physical or biological causes. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 114–16 (H.J. Paton trans.,
Harper ed. 1964). See also THOMAS E. HILL JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT
29 (1991); CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 25
(1996).
108. See sources cited supra note 67.
109. See Baker, supra note 95. Another historically popular view,
compatibilism, has long attempted to square universal causal determinism and
randomness with some sort of meaningful freedom of the will. See, e.g.,
Michael McKenna, Compatibilism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. See John Perry, Wretched
Subterfuge: A Defense of the Compatibilism of Freedom and Natural Causation,
84 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 93 (2010) (borrowing his title from
Immanuel Kant’s less favorable assessment of the compatibilist project), for an
attempt at reconciling causal forces with sufficiently meaningful freedom of
the will.
110. See sources cited supra notes 82–94.
111. See sources cited supra notes 92–98.
112. By contrast, consider the robust metaphysical objectivism of Plato
and Aristotle’s understanding of the development of human potential to a
genuinely higher and better, and not merely preferred, state. See, e.g.,
Christopher V. Mirus, The Metaphysical Roots of Aristotle’s Teleology, 57 REV.
METAPHYSICS 699 (2004); John M. Rist, Some Aspects of Aristotelian Teleology,
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we now tend to reduce self-realization to some forms of personal
preferences, perhaps endorsed across time,113 the idea of selfrealization either frequently conflicts with the constitutional
status of free speech114 or is insufficient to justify the costs that
freedom of speech must inevitably impose in terms of other
values.115 Freedom of speech may promote the fulfillment, for
example, of some sustained preferences. But why presume that
those preferences are themselves really preferable to any
equally steady or intensely endorsed preferences with which
freedom of speech conflicts? Sustained, intense, and widespread
preferences are likely to appear on both sides of a free speech
case. And typically enough, free speech cases pit majority
regulatory preferences against numerical minority speaker
preferences.
IV. The Worth of Freedom of Speech as Dependent Upon Its
Broader Cultural Context
It may be possible to think of constitutional freedom of
speech as a good thing, including its basic free speech values,
apart from its consequences.116 Perhaps one could say that
living under freedom of speech confers a kind of dignity on
everyone, regardless of any effects thereof on the pursuit of
truth, democracy, or self-realization. But it is difficult to see any
such universal bestowal of meaningful dignity as independent of
the contemporary culture. Depending upon the current state of
cultural development, any such effect of free speech on dignity
96 TRANSACTIONS & PROC. AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 337 (1965).
113. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 97–98.
114. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982); Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431 (1990); Mari Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320 (1989).
115. See R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional
Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
527 (2006), for discussion in one important context. Of course, values such as
equality or dignity may ultimately require a metaphysically ambitious defense
as well. But the costs of free speech may also be felt in terms of sheer pain and
suffering not requiring any controversial metaphysical assumptions, for
example.
116. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 63.
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may be either enhanced or minimized. It may, by analogy, be
dignity-enhancing to have access to a comprehensive library, but
less so, or even dignity-impairing, if we have been made only
minimally capable of any meaningful use of that library.117
In any event, it is clear that the worth of constitutional free
speech in promoting the pursuit of truth, effective democratic
processes, and meaningful self-realization depends upon the
plainly variable character of the underlying culture. A culture
that places reduced emphasis on the pursuit of actual knowledge
and truth, or on informed political dialogue and debate on the
merits of issues, or on one’s own genuine personal deficiencies,
excesses, and attempts at self-realization or perfection, is
unlikely to benefit optimally from freedom of speech.
It would not be difficult for an outside observer to conclude
that our broader culture has relevantly improved over time in
some respects, while measurably regressing in others. We now
have widely, if not entirely freely, available databases affording
instantaneous access to detailed elements of most world
cultures.118 But there can be no immediate inference from
internet and social media use to greater relevant knowledge,
enhanced democratic functioning, or to enhanced autonomy and
meaningful self-realization.
Thus, even if internet use, social media time, e-books, and
magazines are factored in, there is clear evidence of cultural
trends non-conducive to realizing, or even concern for, the three
basic free speech values. The point is partly that key sociocultural indicators are not high enough, but also that those
indicators have generally been trending down over the past
several generations. In these respects, the cultural soil in which
the constitutional institution of free speech is planted has
become less effective in producing the classically anticipated

117. Or, more narrowly, consider a potentially dignity-conferring single
book, written in a language we chose never to learn.
118. Google processes more than 60 thousand search queries per second,
or 2 trillion such queries per year. Danny Sullivan, Google Now Handles at
Least 2 Trillion Searches Per Year, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, (May 24, 2016, 12:00
PM),
https://searchengineland.com/google-now-handles-2-999-trillionsearches-per-year-250247. We here set aside any possible issues of conscious
or unconscious bias of any content provider, in any respect, that might impair
realizing the three basic free speech values, given the difficulty of comparing
media biases before and after the internet and social media technology
revolutions.
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benefits of freedom of speech.
First, consider the phenomenon of meaningful literacy.
Whether reading via screens is equally valuable as the reading
of classic texts or not,119 there is evidence that reading of the sort
that infuses distinctive value and meaning into free speech
protection has been declining in our culture over time.120 It is
suggested instead that “the long march to secondary orality
seems well underway.”121 Thus, the reported gradual decline of
reading scores,122 and perhaps not coincidentally, in relevant
vocabulary, has occurred.123
Recent measures of basic
competence as well in crucial subjects including history and

119. See, e.g., NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS
DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2010) (discussing doubts about the value of reading via
screens); Gian Paolo Barbetta et al., Let’s Tweet Again? The Impact of Social
Networks on Literature Achievement in High School Students: Evidence from a
Randomized Controlled Trial, 81 WORKING PAPER SERIES 2 (May 2019),
https://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def081.pdf; Nicholas Carr, Is
Google Making Us Stupid?, THE ATLANTIC, (July/Aug. 2008),
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-usstupid/306868 (discussing effects on the ability to concentrate for sustained
periods).
120. See Steven Johnson, The Fall, and Rise, of Reading, 65 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. 14–15 (Apr. 26, 2019) (documenting not just low levels of high
school, college, and graduate-level educated student reading, but significant
decreases over recent decades, including a 13% decrease in prose literacy
among the graduate school-level students surveyed).
121. Caleb Crain, Why We Don’t Read, Revisited, NEW YORKER (June 14,
2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/why-we-dontread-revisited.
122. See, e.g., Erica L. Meltzer, The Death of the Lecture and the Decline
of
Reading
Scores,
CRITICAL
READER
(June
30,
2018),
https://thecriticalreader.com/the-death-of-the-lecture-and-the-decline-ofreading-scores/.
123. See, e.g., E. D. Hirsch Jr., Vocabulary Declines, with Unspeakable
Results,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
12,
2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444165804578010394278688
454. See also E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Reading Comprehension Requires Knowledge—
Of Words and the World: Scientific Insights Into the Fourth-Grade Slump and
the Nation’s Stagnant Comprehension Scores, 27 AM. EDUCATOR 10, 21 (2003)
(discussing the degree of literacy as dependent upon vocabulary and,
fundamentally, upon knowledge of the world). On a number of measures,
though, it appears that reading scores have been flat, rather than gradually
declining, over recent decades. See, e.g., Natalie Wexler, Why American
Students Haven’t Gotten Better at Reading in 20 Years, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 13,
2018),
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/04/american-studentsreading/557915.

25

260

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.1

elementary civics,124 elementary science methods and results,125
practical arithmetic and mathematics,126 basic positive
124. See, e.g., Americans Are Poorly Informed About Basic Constitutional
Provisions,
ANNENBERG
PUB.
POL’Y
CTR.
(Sept.
12,
2017),
https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-are-poorly-informedabout-basic-constitutional-provisions/ (stating that 26% can name the three
federal government branches, as opposed to 38% as recently as 2011); Allan C.
Brownfield, The Danger Ignorance of History Poses to the Future of a Free
Society,
AM.
COUNCIL
TR.
ALUMNI
(Apr.
22,
2018),
https://www.goacta.org/news/the-danger-ignorance-of-history-poses-to-thefuture-of-a-free-society (stating 26% of surveyed millennials as unable to
identify Auschwitz); Edward Luce, U.S. Declining Interest in History Presents
Risk
to
Democracy,
FIN.
TIMES
(May
2,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/e19d957c-6ca3-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d;
WW
Finds Most Americans Can’t Pass Citizenship Test, WOODROW WILSON NAT’L
FELLOWSHIP
FOUND.
(Feb.
28,
2019),
https://woodrow.org/news/perspectives/ww-finds-most-americans-cant-passcitizenship-test; Failing Our Students, Failing America (2007),
www.americancivicliteracy.org/2007/summary_summary.html.
Again,
reports of gradual decline may be difficult to disentangle from reports of
stagnation at apparently low levels.
125. See, e.g., Clifford N. Lazarus, The Dangers of Scientific Illiteracy,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY
(Apr.
28,
2007),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/think-well/201704/the-dangersscientific-illiteracy (noting the frequency of scientific illiteracy even among
politicians and other elites); ‘Science Ignorance Is Pervasive in Our Society’:
Poll Finds Majority of Americans Question Big Bang Theory, CBS DC (Apr. 22,
2014, 8:17 AM), https://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/04/22/science-ignoranceis-pervasive-in-our-society-poll-finds-majority-of-americans-question-bigbang-theory/; Survey Reveals Public Ignorance of Science, NEW SCIENTIST (July
15, 1989), www.newscientist.com/article/mg12316731-200-survey-revealspublic-ignorance-of-science (surveying 2,000 Americans as well as 2,000
Britons and finding that “[f]orty-three percent of Americans know that
electrons are smaller than atoms” and almost half of Americans surveyed
“know that it takes the Earth a year to orbit the Sun”). It should be
emphasized that the problem of public and elite-level scientific ignorance,
especially across a broad range of issues, is not confined to any particular
segment of the political spectrum. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Public Ignorance and
GMO Foods, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 28, 2017, 3:16 PM),
https://reason.com/2017/12/28/public-ignorance-and-GMO-foods.
See also
Katharine Mangu-Ward, 80 Percent of Americans Want to Label Food That
Contains
DNA,
REASON
(May
24,
2016,
3:25
PM),
https://reason.com/2016/05/24/80-percent-of-americans-want-to-label-fo/.
126. See, e.g., JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL
ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (First Paperback ed. 2001) (1988)
(discussing otherwise well-educated citizens). Anecdotally, one notes the
marketplace failure of the A&W Third Pounder Burger, priced the same as and
otherwise equaling the classic Quarter Pounder, precisely because more than
half of those surveyed believed that a third of a pound is less than a quarter of
a pound, given that three is indeed less than four. This is presumably a
question in which the respondents were directly invested, as distinct from some

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/5

26

2019

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

261

economics,127 and world religions128 have been less than
encouraging.
This is not to suggest that a modestly educated public
cannot benefit from constitutionalizing freedom of speech. Free
speech may well tend in some respects to facilitate, for example,
the collective search for truth, even if most of the public happens
to be deficiently educated. But as underlying educational
levels129 slowly decline or stagnate disappointingly, the risks and
costs of prioritizing speech rights over other significant interests
inevitably tend to increase.130
This is not to deny that much basic ignorance, especially in
a high wealth society with an intensive division of labor, is
entirely rational from the standpoint of any given individual.131
Most simply, if one’s own vote, however well-informed, is
unlikely to tip a given election, one’s rational course in
remote, abstract public policy issue. See Stacy Conradt, Why No One Wanted
A&W’s Third-Pound Burger, MENTAL FLOSS
(Feb. 26, 2016),
http://mentalfloss.com/article/76144/why-no-one-wanted-aws-third-poundburger.
127. See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, Straight Talk about Economic Illiteracy,
MERCATUS
CTR.,
GEORGE
MASON
U.
(July
2004),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Straight-Talk-about-EconomicIlliteracy.pdf (noting the intuitiveness of economically illiterate beliefs, and the
anti-intuitiveness of even some of the most basic positive economic insights).
For an interesting response to Caplan’s discussion, see Jeffrey Friedman,
Irrationality, or Just Plain Ignorance?, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 14, 2006),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/11/14/jeffrey-friedman/irrationality-orjust-plain-ignorance. Consider also that in a self-indulgent and high wealth
culture, it is often simply more gratifying to think of economics in normative
terms than in positive or cumulative evidentiary terms. A focus on the
normative may relieve any pressures toward numeracy.
128. See, e.g., STEPHEN PROTHERO, RELIGIOUS LITERACY: WHAT EVERY
AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW—AND DOESN’T (EPub ed. 2007); U.S. Religious
Knowledge
Survey,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
(Sept.
28,
2010),
www.pewforum.org/2010/09/28/u-s-religious-knowledge-survey.
129. See generally RICHARD ARUM & JOSIPA ROKSA, ACADEMICALLY ADRIFT:
LIMITED LEARNING ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES (2011); Philip Babcock & Mindy
Marks, Leisure College, USA: The Decline in Student Study Time, AM.
ENTERPRISE
INST.
(Aug.
5,
2010),
https://www.aei.org/researchproducts/report/leisure-college-usa/ (discussing the exceptionally broad and
significant decreases among all groups in college study time as consistently
developing over the past multiple decades).
130. See PATRICIA ROBERTS-MILLER, DEMAGOGUERY AND DEMOCRACY
(2017).
131. See, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2d ed. 2016) (discussing rational voter
ignorance of politics and economics).
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nonetheless voting may well be merely to think well of oneself,
or to attempt to ingratiate oneself with some group with which
one identifies, or from which one seeks approval. Even if one
does not publicize how one voted or intends to vote, the personal
payoff from thereby associating oneself with a preferred group
may outweigh the costs of voting, let alone the costs of voting on
the basis of any reasonable assessment of one’s own biases and
limitations.132
Finally, the importance of levels of the public’s competence
in general does not lessen the distinctive importance of
competency levels among cultural elites. It is subject to doubt
whether our contemporary elites tend to display the intellect,
interactive style, priorities, and the character and public virtues
necessary to meaningfully promote the broader cultural
practices of truth seeking, democratic dialogue, and genuine
self-fulfillment via free speech.133 One dimension of this problem
may be the degree to which both elites and non-elites tend to
132. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). See also
EPIC-SUMMARY, SUMMARY: THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2019) (summarizing
Daniel Kahneman’s book). Alternatively, one could think of one’s chosen
political antagonists as less nuanced and less cognitively complex than one’s
chosen allies. See Lucian Gideon Conway III et al., Are Conservatives Really
More Simple-Minded than Liberals? The Domain Specificity of Complex
Thinking, 37 POL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2015); John T. Jost, Ideological Asymmetries
and the Essence of Political Psychology, 38 POL. PSYCHOL. 167 (2017); Joris
Lammers et al., The Political Domain Appears Simpler to the Politically
Extreme Than to Political Moderates, 8 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 612
(2017). Nor is politics a realm in which one’s mistaken judgments are likely to
be fully recognized in their frequency and full weight. See DAVID DUNNING,
SELF-INSIGHT: ROADBLOCKS AND DETOURS ON THE PATH TO KNOWING THYSELF
(2012); PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW
CAN WE KNOW? (2005).
133. See, e.g., CHRIS HAYES, TWILIGHT OF THE ELITES: AMERICA AFTER
MERITOCRACY (2012); TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017); TETLOCK,
supra note 132; Conor Friedersdorf, How Stigma Sows the Seeds of Its Own
Defeat,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/how-stigma-sows-seedsof-its-own-defeat/509273/ (observing that “only 19 percent of millennials agree
that it would be illegitimate for the military to take control of the government,”
and in general, that “[i]n the Western world, the percentage of people who say
that is essential to live in a democracy is in precipitous decline”); Lawrence R.
Jacobs, The Cluelessness of the Elites, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2019),
http://www.startribune.com/the-cluelessness-of-the-elites/506905552/. These
sources variously emphasize perceived inadequacies of contemporary elites,
the inadequacies of non-elites in failing to appropriately respect elite expertise,
or some pathology flowing from elite/non-elite interaction.
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avoid any meaningful reassessment of their views and
judgments in the face of apparently important, and particularly
adverse, new information.134 The classic study of largely
unrevised basic beliefs in the face of apparent disconfirmation,
When Prophecy Fails,135 focused on a fringe UFO cult’s
predictions of the end of the world.136 Today’s version of this
phenomenon of remarkably refractory persistence of belief in the
face of counter evidence is much broader. We cling to beliefs
despite increasingly prominent counter-evidence.137
A
reasonable sense of fallibility is often replaced by what amounts
to a remarkable imperviousness to evidence.
Under these contemporary circumstances, the realistic
value of traditional free speech doctrines is gradually
diminished.
V. Some Competing Value Costs of Free Speech Under
Contemporary Cultural Conditions
One important dimension of our free speech problem is that
evolving cultural conditions have reduced the usefulness of free
speech in promoting the search for truth, meaningful democracy,
and autonomy or self-realization in any meaningful sense.138
This amounts to the reduced value side of the problem. Some
attention should be paid as well to the increasing cultural cost139
134. See TETLOCK, supra note 132.
135. See LEON FESTINGER, HENRY RIECKEN, & STANLEY SCHACHTER, WHEN
PROPHECY FAILS (Reprint ed. 2009) (1956).
136. See id.
137. One common reaction, beyond denial or some other classical defense
mechanism, seems to involve not publicly resurrecting the apparently
discredited belief until some time has passed, or until the context has somehow
changed. See FREUD, supra note 8. Apparently, refuted beliefs often go into a
sort of dormant or latent phase.
138. See infra Parts III, IV. It is also possible that the current costs of
restrictions on speech are mitigated by an increasing variety of protective
techniques in communicating, collectively referred to as esoteric writing. See
ARTHUR M. MELZER, PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES: THE LOST HISTORY OF
ESOTERIC WRITING (2014); Paul J. Bagley, On the Practice of Esotericism, 53 J.
HIST. IDEAS 231 (1992).
139. The term “cultural cost” is used here to distinguish social costs of
the content or message of speech, or of the sheer inescapability of speech in
public or private spaces, from reduced costs of speech in terms of, say,
increased low-cost access via social media to a potentially broad audience for
one’s messages. See sources cited supra notes 67, 122.
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dimension of the free speech problem. It is easier, however, to
classify the purported benefits of free speech140 than it is to
similarly categorize its cultural costs.141
Thus, no useful inventory of all of the increasing cultural
costs of freedom of speech is realistically possible. We can,
however, take samplings of some of the social costs of free speech
in selected contexts. Below, we briefly consider, in turn, the
increased cultural significance of college campus hate speech142;
of group-disparaging speech by lower-level public school
students143; and of the group-disparagement potential of
registered trademarks.144
As a matter of sheer numbers, the cultural costs of
university campus hate speech, whether legally protected or not,
must necessarily have increased over the past several decades.
This is largely a matter of simple arithmetic. After all, the
visible presence of many of the now typical hate speech victims
was modest in the decades of the 1950’s and 1960’s.145 In
particular, “[p]rior to the late 1960[‘]s most of the nation’s
highest-ranked colleges and universities enrolled token
numbers of black students. In some cases, there were no
African-American students on the campuses of our most highly
regarded institutions.”146 More broadly, from 1976 to 2008,
Hispanic college enrollment rose six-fold,147 while black student
enrollment rose from 943,000 to 2,269,000.148 The percentages

II.

140. Under our conventional free speech value headings. See infra Part

141. To a degree, however, some of the cultural costs of free speech could
be formulated in terms of losses of autonomy or of self-realization. See sources
cited supra note 114 (discussing some effects of hate speech).
142. See infra notes 151–160 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 161–172 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 173–181 and accompanying text. These cultural costs
turn on the message of speech in question. Some of the increasing cultural
costs of free speech, however, may reflect the sheer inescapability of speech in
public places, rather than the content of any speech. See R. George Wright,
Public Fora and the Problem of Too Much Speech, 106 KY. L. J. 409 (2016).
145. See JBHE Foundation, Inc., Long-Term Black Student Enrollment
Trends at the Nation’s Highest-Ranked Colleges and Universities, 8 J. BLACKS
HIGHER EDUC. 10, 10 (1996); Susan Aud et al., Status and Trends in the
Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. EDUC.
STAT. (July 2010).
146. JBHE Foundation, Inc., supra note 145, at 12.
147. Susan Aud et al., supra note 145, at 122.
148. Id.
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of women college students also increased over the same
period.149
Doubtless, the basic free speech values have been, in some
respects, variously furthered by these very trends. But our focus
here on the cultural costs of free speech constitutionalization150
requires that we take account also of the costs of identity-based
assaultive speech on campus. Consider, concretely, university
campus-based incidents of the sort more generally described by
Professor Richard Delgado:
[F]ace-to-face vituperation can pollute the
environment in ways almost as damaging as
billboards and monuments. A minority group
member who is the target of a racial name hurled
out of the blue is apt to review it in his mind many
times. He or she may recount it to friends and
family, who may, in turn, tell others . . . .151
These sorts of harms may be largely intangible, but they
adversely implicate the free speech value of self-realization of
the target or victim, in multiple ways.152 Nor are the harms of
personal insults and epithets typically reducible through what
classical free speech theory refers to as “more speech,” or
counterspeech.153 Indeed, we might well conclude that in typical
cases, attempting to rebut intentionally degrading and
scurrilous speech on the merits, as though in some sort of good
faith mutual inquiry into the truth, would itself be objectively
humiliating.154
149. Id.
150. We here set aside distinctions between federal and state
constitutional free speech law, federal statutory and regulatory protection of
free speech, and the state action requirement for violation of the First
Amendment. See R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the
University, 43 J. C. & U. L. 1 (2017), for further discussion.
151. Richard Delgado, Book Review, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 232, 233 (2012)
(reviewing Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1596 (2010)).
152. See sources cited supra note 114.
153. See sources cited supra notes 20–23. Note that these types of harms
of campus hate speech are not spread evenly across members of dominant and
traditionally subordinated groups.
154. This may be true even if one assumes that the presumed audience
for such a rebuttal is still available. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD
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Some similar costs of contemporary free speech law arise in
public school student speech cases, with the addition of
distinctive costs to the multiple socializing functions of the
public schools.155 The eventually mooted case of Harper v.
Poway Unified School District considered whether a public high
school may “prohibit students from wearing t-shirts with
messages that condemn and denigrate other students based on
their sexual orientation[.]”156 The court recognized that public
schools have a number of commonly recognized purposes, any
one of which could potentially conflict with broadly protected
student speech rights.157
In particular, the court recognized the possibility of
persistent psychological injury stemming from even nonconfrontational condemnation “on the basis of a core identifying
characteristic
such
as
race,
religion,
or
sexual
orientation . . . .”158 One might well think of such injuries not
only in terms of privacy,159 security,160 and equal educational
opportunity,161 but as well, ironically, in terms of the basic free
speech value of individual autonomy and self-realization,162 to
the extent to which we still wish to take the ideas of autonomy
and self-realization seriously.
In general, the costs of
recognizing “freedom for the thought that we hate”163 are not
equivalent to freedom for the thought that foreseeably wounds
or impairs at a fundamental personal and emotional level.164
GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (2017); NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE
SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP (2018); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, SPEAK FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH
(2018); Andrew Altman, Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical
Examination, 103 ETHICS 302 (1993).
155. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.
2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007); R. George Wright, Post-Tinker,
10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2014) (noting the variable and multidimensional role
of the public schools in basic education, teaching tolerance, equality, and
mutual respect in political matters).
156. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th
Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
157. See id. at 1176.
158. Id. at 1178.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See generally sources cited supra notes 93–116.
163. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929).
164. See Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178–79. The effects of an abstractly
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Consider, as well, the cultural costs of registering
trademarks that disparage particular groups through
recognizable slurs and epithets.165 Part of the problem in fully
recognizing the cultural costs of officially registering such
trademarks may lie in the earnest desire of some trademark
applicants to re-appropriate, or to drain the pejorative
associations of, the typically disparaging slur or epithet in
question.166 However laudable, or effective, such intentions may
conceivably be, they do not present the same problems of
cultural cost as unequivocally disparaging trademarks.
It is possible that market forces, if not simple decency, will
tend to suppress the desire to register a group-disparaging
trademark, or at least to reduce the value of such a mark.167 Our
concern, however, is with trends in the cultural costs of groupdisparaging marks. Of late, even national-level sellers of goods
and services have tended to reject the traditional strategy168 of
seeking to broaden their market by avoiding political offense.169
expressed ideological statement, and of direct disparagement based on core
personal identity, thus need not be the same.
165. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(a) to address trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into
contempt, or disrepute” any person). See also Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito,
879 F.3d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing id.); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) in the context of a different
trademark provision addressing “immoral” or “scandalous” matter), aff’d sub
nom. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019). See generally Lisa P. Ramsey,
Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal v. Tam, 56 HOUS. L.
REV. 401 (2018).
166. See generally Matal, 137 S. Ct 1744; Wandering Dago, Inc., 879 F.3d
20.
167. See generally R. George Wright, Political Discrimination by Private
Employers, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 761 (2018).
168. As legendarily articulated by Michael Jordan, to the effect that
Republicans buy sneakers too. But see Giri Nathan, Did Michael Jordan Ever
Say “Republicans Buy Sneakers, Too”?, DEADSPIN (Jul. 26, 2016, 2:02 PM)
https://deadspin.com/did-michael-jordan-ever-say-republicans-buy-sneakers1784530317.
169. See, e.g., Martin Armstrong, America’s Most Polarizing Brands,
STATISTA (Oct. 25, 2017), www.statista.com/chart/11601/america’s-mostpolarizing; How Americans View the Politics of Brands, AXIOS (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/political-polarization-business-politics-brandsf7b78ed9-693f-4106-8895-4c8409859f8b.html; Oliver McAteer, How Brands
Can Benefit From Polarization, CAMPAIGN US (Sept. 21, 2018),
www.campaignlive.com/article/brands-benefit-polarization/1493443; Patricia
Nakache, Polarization Is an Opportunity For Mission-Driven Brands, FAST CO.
(Nov.
7,
2018),
www.fastcompany.com/90264170/polarization-is-anopportunity; Nailya Ordabayeva, How Liberals and Conservatives Shop
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Corporations are now often willing to risk, if not invite, the
alienation of some potential customers for the sake of a better
image with, and greater loyalty from, other sometimes
demographically targeted customers.170
In light of this trend, consider the case of small business
enterprises that believe, perhaps rightly, that in an era of
increasingly
extreme,
encompassing,
and
intense
polarization,171 they may benefit by alienating perhaps even 90%
of the broad possible customer base for the sake of greater
loyalty from the remaining 10%. Why not then obtain, and
publicize, what may seem to some an officially endorsed
trademarking of a crudely disparaging epithet?
The protected free speech status of disparaging epithets,
even where such disparagement is clearly intended, would seem
to follow from the logic of the case of Matal v. Tam.172 The harms
of such exposure could track those discussed above.173 And there
would seem to be no technological guarantees against anyone’s
involuntary exposure to such trademarks, or to news reports of
their existence.
These examples of the evidently increasing cultural costs of
constitutionally protected speech certainly do not exhaust the
field. There are also arguable cultural costs that are admittedly
more diffuse and contestable, but also subtler and pervasive.
Consider today’s constitutional protection of commercial
speech.174 Whatever the goals of restrictions on commercial
marketing speech,175 there are always broader, but admittedly
controversial, costs of commercial speech. No doubt, rightly or
Differently, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 19, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/howliberals-and-conservatives-shop-differently?autocomplete=true.
170. See sources cited supra note 169.
171. Consider the recent rise of the word “hathos” to describe the pleasure
people might derive from their hatred of particular other people. See, e.g., More
On the Origins of Hathos, WORD PRESS
(Dec. 22, 2008),
https://thehathos.wordpress.com/2008/12/22/more-on-the-origins-of-hathos.
172. See 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
173. See sources cited supra notes 151, 154–64.
174. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (discussing current
Supreme Court doctrine on the scope and protection of commercial speech). In
Sorrell, the Court applied some form of “heightened” scrutiny to strike down
state statutory restrictions on “the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy
records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors.” Id. at 557–
72.
175. Id. at 557–72.
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wrongly, a “consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial
speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent
political dialogue.”176 But some speech-related cultural cost, of
whatever magnitude, is involved in, for example, prescription
drug marketing speech.
As it turns out, the apparent competing speech of rival
prescription drug sellers is also, more broadly, mutually
reinforcing speech. Competing advertisements may, jointly,
lead many persons to act as though the best solution for their
depression, anxiety, loneliness, and other ills lies in the
consumption of prescription drugs.
In some cases, this
commercial approach may indeed be best. But in other cases,
repairing damaged lifestyles and relationships would be more
effective. The free speech problem is that protected commercial
advertising speech systematically prioritizes the former over the
latter.177 Other speakers are certainly permitted to argue, on
the contrary, for the importance for one’s health of lifestyles and
relationships. But in the marketplace of ideas, they will
normally, and increasingly,178 be out-budgeted.179
Again, one might dismiss or deny the cultural costs of
protected commercial speech, but the broader case for the
substantial and increasing cultural costs of protected speech in
general remains. As the benefits of protected speech in terms of
the historically crucial free speech values decline, the cultural
costs of free speech have generally tended to increase. Freedom
of speech, as normally understood, is itself substantially and
increasingly an anachronistic remnant: a holdover from a
previous culture, with only a diminished current justifiability.

176. Id. at 566 (quoting the attorney advertising case of Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
177. See generally R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We
Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 137 (1994)
(elaborating on this admittedly controversial argument).
178. For a sense of the remarkable estimated magnitudes, see Lindsey
Tanner, US Medical Marketing Reaches $30 Billion, Drug Ads Top Surge,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan.
8,
2019),
https://www.apnews.com/f44a7baa710d458ca50edd66affc1b91.
179. See id.
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VI. Conclusion
In broad strokes, the traditionally cited free speech values
of the pursuit of knowledge and truth, meaningful democratic
self-government, and the promotion of genuine autonomy and
self-realization have gradually evolved, in our culture, in ways
that have reduced their meaningfulness and their power to
justify constitutionally protecting speech generally at the
expense of significant and more elemental values. Other
ongoing cultural trends, including those related to education,
have further reduced the ability of freedom of speech generally
to promote its historic basic values and purposes. At the same
time, some key cultural costs of freedom of speech have been
correspondingly increasing.
The case for a continuing elevated constitutional status for
free speech in general has thus weakened over time. The
constitutional status of freedom of speech thus amounts, at this
point, to a cultural holdover.
Those who view these
developments as largely regrettable must come to terms with the
persistence, and apparent stability, of most of the underlying
cultural trends. It is technically possible that these cultural
trends could be reversed, in some cases, by an increased cultural
emphasis on developing the most valuable versions of what we
might call the basic epistemic180 virtues.181 Whether any such
180. The idea of epistemic virtues and epistemic vices reflects the view
that there can be more and less effective ways of forming and testing and
revising beliefs of all sorts. See generally J. Turri, Virtue Epistemology, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue.
181. The Court’s classic free speech cases themselves sometimes suggest
a vital role for widely recognized moral and particularly epistemic virtues. See
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
(discussing “courage” as the “secret of liberty”), overruled in part by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
95 (1940) (discussing “fearlessness”). For a discussion of Justice Brandeis’
concurrence in Whitney, see Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal
of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
For classic expositions of the relevant widely accepted basic virtues,
see ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans., Further
revised ed. 2004) (~350 BCE) (discussing the virtues of courage, temperance or
reasonable self-restraint, and prudential wisdom); THE BHAGAVAD-GITA,
KRISHNA’S COUNSEL IN TIME OF WAR, THIRTEENTH TEACHING (Barbara Stoller
Miller trans. 1986) (stating “knowledge means humility, sincerity, nonviolence, patience, honesty . . . purity, stability, self-restraint”). Among
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increased cultural emphasis on largely uncontroversial virtues
is on the horizon is, for our present purposes, hereby entrusted
to the judgment of the reader. In the absence of any such
developments, however, we will be increasingly likely, for
increasingly evident reasons, to see broad constitutional
freedom of speech as variously, “trivial, foreign, and
unnecessarily costly,”182 as commonly involving something akin
to secular “idolatry,”183 or as a legal practice subject to politicized
“weaponization.”184

contemporary writers, see ANDRÉ COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE
GREAT VIRTUES: THE USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 31–59 (Catherine
Temerson trans., 2001) (1996).
For useful contemporary discussions of the crucial epistemic virtues,
see JASON BAEHR, THE INQUIRING MIND: ON INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND VIRTUE
EPISTEMOLOGY (2013); CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN,
CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION (2004);
ROBERT C. ROBERTS & W. JAY WOOD, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: AN ESSAY IN
REGULATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY (2009); Heather Battaly, Closed-Mindedness and
Dogmatism, 15 EPISTEME 261 (2018); Heather Battaly, Intellectual
Perseverance, 14 J. MORAL PHIL. 669 (2017); Paul Bloomfield, Epistemic
Temperance, 56 AM. PHIL. Q. 109 (2019); Dennis Whitcomb et al., Intellectual
Humility: Owning Our Limitations, XCIV PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
509 (2017); Michael D. Baumtrog, The Willingness to Be Rationally Persuaded,
ONTARIO
SOC’Y
FOR
THE
STUDY
OF
ARGUMENTATION
(2016),
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/71/.
For useful background on equality and inequality of persons’ relevant
epistemic backgrounds in particular decisional contexts, see BRYAN FRANCES,
DISAGREEMENT (2014); Bryan Frances & Jonathan Matheson, Disagreement,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL.
(Feb.
23,
2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disagreement; R. George Wright, Epistemic
Peerhood in the Law, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2017).
Finally, consider that some persons might argue today, whether
rightly or wrongly, that a number of the above virtues classically thought to
enhance the value of free discussion and debate are not worthy of cultivation
by all persons, across the board.
182. For a different context, see Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial
Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 340 (1984).
183. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
10 (2016).
184. See Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First
Amendment,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
30,
2018),
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservativessupreme-court.html.
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